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Provinces are curious things. They are administrative arrangements that allow the 
state to reach deeper into the countryside. Provincial bureaucracy is hardly an exciting 
business, except perhaps for bureaucrats. But provinces can also be vehicles for an 
identity. Then they become charged with a powerful, if ambiguous, sentiment, the 
provincial community's feeling that it at once belongs to the greater nation yet remains 
separate from it. The contrast between the two sides of this provincial phenomenon 
has a parallel in the nation-state. Though usually mentioned in one breath, the nation 
and the state in the phrase nation-state also live in different worlds. The nation is the 
human community that belongs to an envisaged territory. The state is the set of 
institutions by which that territory is ruled. Modern nationalism has persuaded us that 
the fused entity is more real than its separate parts, but it was not always so.
Many new provinces were created in Indonesia in the late 1950s, Central 
Kalimantan among them. It was affected by and contributed to the dramatic tension 
that enveloped the regions beyond Jakarta. These were still the heady years of 
nationalism. All those who helped create Central Kalimantan in 1957 spoke of it in 
terms of the "nation"—that is, they perceived its establishment as an identity issue.
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Naturally the view from Jakarta differed from that in Kalimantan. The metropolitan 
media portrayed the event as bringing diverse parts into the one nation. Locals who 
had fought for the province described it with quiet satisfaction as a revolt against 
Jakarta, mounted on behalf of their own separate identity within the nation. The 
ambiguity of belonging and separateness was itself delicious and has always defined 
the Indonesian nation. If everyone at the time agreed to keep the "state" out of the 
discussion, that should be no surprise. The term "nation" better satisfied the desire for 
heroic, if ambiguous, togetherness than did any reference to some administrative 
arrangement. The Indonesian discourse concerning provincial identity in the late 1950s 
emphasized the voluntary, popular character of this provincial community.
However, this discourse was a kind of smoke-screen. Behind it, a power play was 
being carried out that involved a much smaller number of actors. This article argues 
that the creation of Central Kalimantan was less an act of nation-building than of state­
building. It was the solution to a problem of the state, namely its vulnerability in the 
remote regions of the archipelago after the ravages of war and revolution. The problem 
of state-building under conditions of weakness at the center is of general interest. It 
recurs in twentieth-century Indonesian history at various moments. A study of the way 
it was resolved in one place will help us to understand better why the process of state­
building has been described in such ethnic terms at moments when the center is weak. 
The contradiction between the national and provincial readings of the creation of this 
province vanishes when we trace the dynamics to this more fundamental level.
The importance of this story lies in the insight it gives us into the relationship 
between state formation and ethnicity. Earlier formulations by Clifford Geertz and Bill 
Liddle remain influential, but they do not capture this story perfectly.2 In Geertz's 
classic statement, the state represents modernity, but it must struggle to impose its will 
on local communities still locked in pre-state, "primordial" loyalties. Liddle, through a 
detailed study in North Sumatra, modified this position by noting that locals actually 
harbor a range of loyalties, simultaneously toward the nation and toward less inclusive 
communities of various kinds. But still, even in Liddle's analysis, the state is presented 
as a modern creature, which faced the problem of exerting its will over these fractious 
locals and their narrow loyalties. It had only the unsatisfactory choice between 
responding democratically, and thereby risking government paralysis (as occurred in 
the 1950s before Guided Democracy), or being authoritarian in order to get things done 
(the New Order solution). Benedict Anderson, writing at the height of the New Order, 
identified a kind of see-saw movement, in which now the nation (post-revolutionary 
1950s), now the state (New Order), enjoyed dominance over the other.3 Yet even this
2 Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," 
in Old Societies and New States, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York, NY: Free Press, 1963), pp. 105-57; R. William 
Liddle, Ethnicity, Party, and National Integration (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1970), 
esp. pp. 211-14.
3 Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical 
Perspective," Journal o f Asian Studies 42,3 (May 1983): 477-496. The image of an unassailably strong state 
during the New Order referred back to the late-colonial bureaucratic state. See Harry J. Benda, "The 
Pattern of Administrative Reforms in the Closing Years of Dutch Rule in Indonesia," Journal o f Asian 
Studies 25,4 (1966): 589-605; Ruth T. McVey, "The Beamtenstaat in Indonesia," in Interpreting Indonesian 
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sophisticated solution assumed a kind of zero sum game between two entities whose 
interests differed so fundamentally that they were unable to change each other.
Is it not possible, however, to imagine a more transformative relationship between 
state and society in which each continually reshapes the other, so that the two become 
a single political constellation? Joel Migdal began developing a non-zero sum concept 
of "the state-in-society" in the early 1990s as a response to the failures of 
modernization theory and dependency theory, but with a greater acknowledgment of 
the role of "society" in his theory than one found in the "bringing-the-state-back-in" 
approach much discussed at that time. He pictured the state as permanently locked in 
a struggle to dominate social forces, and added another dimension by disaggregating 
the battle into a series of arenas ranging from the "commanding heights" to "the 
trenches" within local communities. A spectrum of polities emerged from this analysis, 
ranging from the state that is able to transform society totally, at one end, to the state 
that completely fails to penetrate society, at the other end. A later book modified the 
analysis by also allowing the state—and not only society—to be transformed. This 
revised theory defined the state simply as "a field of power marked by the use and 
threat of violence," and focused on the "actual practices of [the state's] multiple parts."4
Rather than speak of the state as a whole as either "weak" or "strong," it is 
therefore more helpful to describe the constellation, state-in-society, at different levels 
of the polity. Here we distinguish between those polities in which power is mainly 
exercised from a single center and those where it is exercised mainly from multiple 
centers. State-building in Indonesia has always taken place in one of two modes—the 
centralized or the decentralized. The years under discussion here—especially the late 
1940s and the late 1950s—were characterized by the prevalence of the decentralized 
mode. This article is part of a growing literature fueled by increased academic interest 
in studying the contours of the decentralized mode of state-building in Indonesia's 
outer islands.5 These two modes have remained an enduring feature of Indonesia's 
political landscape to the present day. During certain periods the decentralized mode 
has predominated (the nineteenth century, the era characterized by the federal 
territories 1946-49, 1956-58, 1999-2001), while at other times the centralized has been 
more evident (1900 to about 1927,1959-98).
When the decentralized mode is dominant, the main problem for the central power 
intent on maintaining order is to build relations with numerous local elites in the 
regions, while ensuring that these do not align together in resistance against the center. 
This dynamic tends to narrow the negotiating idiom so that it focuses on place-of- 
origin ethnicity and to restrict the permissible range of local partners to individuals 
who can exert their will locally. Decentralized state-building therefore relies to a great 
extent on tradition, ethnicity, and hierarchy—or, if necessary, invented versions of 
these elements. Under these conditions, the center often acts in ways that contradict its
4 Joel S. Migdal, "The State in Society: An Approach to Struggles for Domination," in State Power and Social 
Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World, ed. Joel S. Migdal, Aful Kohl, and Vivienne Shue 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 7-34; Joel S. Migdal, State in Society: Studying How 
States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 15-16.
5 See, for example, Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, eds., Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: 
Decentralisation and Democratisation (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003); Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van 
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ostensible modernizing mission. The centralized mode, by contrast, emphasizes 
modernity and nationalism. This is not to deny that modern nationalism can appeal at 
the local level, and that an interest in tradition may influence the center, but these 
elements were less decisive for state-building at the critical moments in the 1950s. 
Building relations with local partners is a form of indirect rule, which results in a 
"cultural" kind of governance that is asymmetric but does not wholly eviscerate 
autonomous local agencies. Liddle did not consider this possibility—it is neither 
democratic nor authoritarian in the centralist New Order sense.
A study of indirect rule highlights the Janus-faced character of the modern state. 
Scholars have tended to portray indirect rule as a system that provides local 
communities protective exclusion from an oppressive political process, but Mahmood 
Mamdani in his work on sub-Saharan Africa depicts it persuasively as a hegemonic 
exercise that, in fact, incorporates the colonized "natives" into a system of power. It 
produces local despotism.6 The state coopts, or creates, local despots, loyal partners at 
the local level, whose authority rests less on democratic legitimacy than on 
demagoguery and violence. For why should the local necessarily be more democratic 
than the national? Society, meanwhile, is itself transformed by the indirect rule process. 
Ethnicity becomes concretized in shapes it did not previously possess. This form of 
governance sometimes even becomes an idiom for protest against the state. More often 
it is the idiom of choice for local aspirants to office within the state. Indirect rule has 
been repeatedly deployed in Indonesia, particularly at times when the center is weak. 
The history of Central Kalimantan provides an example.
The climax in the nation-oriented narrative of Central Kalimantan occurred on 
Wednesday, July 17, 1957. On that day, President Sukarno traveled up the mighty 
Kahayan River of Central Borneo with a convoy of boats to lay the first stone for 
Palangkaraya, capital of the new province of Central Kalimantan. Until then, this 
jungle-clad interior region had been part of South Kalimantan province, ruled from the 
rivermouth capital, Banjarmasin. For thirty-six hours, all along the river, according to a 
serialized report in a major Jakarta daily, villagers came out in their canoes to greet the 
president and shout "Merdeka!," "Freedom!" They had only seen the president before 
in pictures sold on the riverboats. When on the previous day Sukarno had approached 
the gateway of the Dayak interior at Kuala Kapuas, the sound of drums had reached 
the party's ears even before it rounded the last bend. Fabulously dressed warriors 
circled their canoes in front of the president's craft. When he stepped ashore, the 
people invited him to mount a magnificent chair borne on poles. He refused, placed 
the red and white flag on the chair instead, then joined his people in hoisting it aloft. 
Sukarno told the crowd that the spirit of the Proclamation of '45 still lived in 
Kalimantan, and that "foreigners" who said Kalimantan wanted to separate from 
Indonesia had been proven wrong. A similar scene was enacted the next day in newly 
christened Palangkaraya, which up until this day had been a small village of five 
hundred inhabitants called Pahandut. "One can imagine," wrote an impressed 
metropolitan journalist who accompanied the president's party, "how extraordinary 
these original customs of the Dayak tribe are, which reflect an authenticity, a clarity, as
6 Mahmood Mamdani, "Historicizing Power and Responses to Power: Indirect Rule and Its Reform," Social 
Research 66,3 (Fall 1999): 859-86. See also his earlier publication, Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: 
Contemporary Africa and the Legacy o f Late Colonialism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
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well as an innocence of all the bad things that threaten the large cities of Indonesia ... 
[Yet] even in this remote and lonely place, Bung Karno as the head of a state of eighty 
million Indonesians has found his people."7
Like a provincial Brasilia meant to be created ex nihilo from the jungle, 
Palangkaraya thus became Sukarno's stage for a theatre of the nation. Later he 
suggested its central location in the archipelago made it the capital of choice for 
"Maphilindo," a proposed entity created from the union of Indonesia with Malaya and 
the Philippines. He even persuaded the Russians to build a road there. It ran into the 
jungle from Palangkaraya for a few kilometers, then petered out. Central Kalimantan 
thus became both a powerful symbol of the united non-ethnic Indonesian nation-state 
and (because the discourse always linked it to a tribal group) one of the most "ethnic" 
of Indonesia's provinces. For the Dayak warriors who greeted President Sukarno were 
not merely decorative. They represented the essence of what the province was about. 
Granted, nationals and provincials saw them differently. Jakartans saw primitives 
offering their loyalty to a greater whole, while locals saw assertions of an irreducible 
local identity. But for both, the warriors were an essential element. If we can 
understand how both these very different perceptions could exist at the same time, it 
will help us in a bigger quest, namely the attempt to grasp the interaction between 
ethnicity and the nation-state in Indonesia more broadly. This case makes us suspect 
that ethnicity was not merely a cultural phenomenon, and certainly not a mere vestige, 
but was woven into the fabric of the modern state in the decisive decade after World 
War II.
Sukarno's theatrical performance on the Kahayan River masked the true dynamic 
of the relationship between ethnicity and the nation-state. The crux of the matter lies 
less with the nation than with the state, which urgently needed to find loyal personnel 
in the regions beyond Java to build its capacity to maintain order. It faced a serious 
state-building problem. Two key observations will set us on our way. First, the 
proliferation of new provinces in the turbulent years 1957-58 are best seen as a 
colonizing expansion of the Indonesian state into weakly governed corners of its 
territory. Central Kalimantan was one of eight new provinces at this time, added on 
top of the ten original ones.8 The establishment of these new provinces was a response 
to disintegrative conditions, but their creation was not in itself a disintegrative event. 
Several anthropologists, no doubt reflecting the local reading, have written about the 
creation of Central Kalimantan province as a case of "secession" and "rebellion,"9 but 
this seems unwarranted. It was neither a fragmentation of the state nor really a 
rebellion from below. On the contrary, the establishment of new provinces was a 
flanking movement carried out by the weak center to combat the disintegrative 
regional revolts. The expansion was motivated as much by a pull from the peripheries 
as a push from the center, and thus resembled the outward expansion of colonial
7 See the articles by M. H. Munawar in the national daily Merdeka, July 17 and 23-27,1957; Palangkaraya 
was then spelled Palangka Raya. Two photos of the Sukarno visit are in Tjilik Riwut, Kalimantan 
Memanggil (Djakarta: Endang, 1958), pp. 133-34.
8 A full list is given below.
9 Douglas Miles, Cutlass and Crescent Moon: A Case Study o f Social and Political Change in Outer Indonesia 
(Sydney: Center for Asian Studies, University of Sydney, 1976), pp. 119-20; Joseph Aaron Weinstock, 
"Kaharingan and the Luangan Dayaks: Religion and Identity in Central-East Borneo" (PhD dissertation, 
Cornell University, 1983), pp. 131-35.
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empires.10 All the new Indonesian provinces were located at the outer margins of the 
archipelagic state, with densely populated Java at its center. Sukarno's generous 
symbolism notwithstanding, this development constituted an expansion of the state at 
least as much as of the nation.
Second, and this too notwithstanding Sukarno's enthusiasm, the results of this 
peripheral pull played out among a small number of state functionaries and their non­
state clients both at the center and in the peripheries. The campaign to establish new 
provinces outside Java was not a popular movement, at least not one rooted in 
widespread grassroots organization. Most political parties disliked the ethnic talk that 
accompanied the creation of new provinces, and they were drawn into the process of 
their creation against their will. At the center were security officials anxious to locate 
loyal and effective partners in the peripheries. On the periphery were lower level civil 
servants eager to prove their loyalty and lay claim to their piece of the expanding 
bureaucratic pie. They had to distinguish themselves both from the rebels and from 
rival loyalists. The negotiations between center and periphery were as a result 
conspiratorial. Participants switched back and forth between direct and indirect 
strategies, between intensive lobbying and the sponsoring of obscure militias. The 
idiom that passed between them was a hybrid. Sometimes they talked like nationalists, 
partly because they were genuinely enthusiastic about the new nation and partly 
because they were just loyal to their metropolitan superiors. Sometimes they talked 
like ethnic primordialists, partly because they needed to recruit new followers and 
partly to advertise their own uniqueness. The exotically dressed tribal warriors who 
assured Sukarno that the disparate nation was firmly unified nicely illustrated this 
hybrid of idioms. The following account traces the history of these center-periphery 
negotiations in two phases, one during the federal period under the colonial Dutch just 
after World War II, the next within an independent Indonesia, during a period 
climaxing in 1957. We will see that, in each phase, security-oriented state elites from 
the center sought out and negotiated deals with loyalist elites in the periphery. The 
result was a "Dayak" administrative territory that had been brought halfway to 
completion by the end of the first phase and was fully established in the second.
Federalism and the Dayak Council (1946-1949)
"Dayak" is a generic term first employed by western anthropologists to embrace 
the various non-Muslim indigenous peoples of Borneo. Dayaks generally live in the 
interior, while the main coastal towns are dominated by indigenous Muslims 
(sometimes known generically as Malays) and by migrant groups.11 This huge island is 
today divided between three sovereign nations, and the Indonesian part of it is divided 
into four provinces. Politicized ethnic Dayak movements have a history in most parts 
of Borneo, but they tend to circulate within these political boundaries. Thus the
10 The processes resembled those theorized in the 1970s by scholars seeking to clarify the reasons for 
imperialist expansion in those cases where the economic drive from the center seemed an inadequate 
explanation. Empire was drawn outward by security concerns on the peripheries or by the little battles of 
collaborating elites in the peripheral regions. See David K. Fieldhouse, Colonialism 1870-1945: An 
Introduction (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981); Ronald Robinson, "Non-European Foundations of 
European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration," in Imperialism: The Robinson and Gallagher 
Controversy, ed. Roger Louis (New York, NY: New Viewpoints, 19713), pp. 128-51.
11 Victor T. King, The Peoples o f Borneo (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
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movements in West Kalimantan and in the area that became Central Kalimantan are 
practically unrelated.
Elsewhere I have tried to show that the key figure in the late-colonial Dayak 
movement in the central part of Borneo was Hausmann Baboe.12 Both mission and 
government molded the career of this energetic native district chief. Initially he felt 
excited by the promise of national and class solidarity as forces to be mustered against 
the colonial oppressor. But after the Dutch successfully suppressed the militant 
nationalist movement in 1927, and as he himself grew wealthier and hence more 
cooperative, he was drawn to participate in the ethnic politics declared permissible by 
the Dutch. The colonials pictured the Netherlands Indies as an array of discrete ethnic 
units, each occupying its own territory, and they provided seats for representatives of 
these units in the colonial proto-parliament, the Volksraad. Hausmann Baboe became 
involved in lobbying for the addition of a Dayak member to this body.
The Dayak-dominated interior before World War II was encompassed by the large 
"government" of Southeast Borneo, with its capital in Banjarmasin. Dayaks in the 
region had never before had a delineated territory of their own. They began to press 
for the recognition of a territorial identity for the first time when Governor Haga 
started implementing a series of Dayak reserves in the Buntok marshes and the 
Meratus Mountains northeast of Banjarmasin just before the war. Native reserves were 
being established in other countries as well about this time—including in the United 
States (the Indian New Deal of 1934 revamped the reserves carved out in the 1860s) 
and South Africa in 1913 and 1936.13 Yet administrators at the time considered it 
impossible to grant the tribal Dayaks any more than the limited legal autonomy they 
already enjoyed as an indigenous community (rechtsgemeenschap) under colonial rule. 
One oft-mentioned reason was that Dayak society was "utterly primitive." Another 
had to do with colonial law. Territorial autonomy was part of the system of indirect 
rule, through which precolonial entities retained some life of their own. Its basis lay in 
hundreds of "self-ruling" aristocratic principalities throughout the Netherlands Indies. 
The Banjarmasin sultanate had been destroyed in 1859-60, however, and the Dutch 
had ruled southern and central Borneo directly ever since.14 No legal basis for indirect 
rule existed here any more.
Nevertheless, a series of conservative reforms triggered by the rise of the 
nationalist movement in the mid-1920s eventually made it possible to construct a kind 
of indirect rule even in areas that were being directly ruled. The reforms aimed to 
recreate the conditions of indirect rule. The Self-Governing Regulation of 1938 
intended to strengthen traditional political entities that had been hollowed out by the 
earlier modernizing and centralizing policies. As it happened, the Regulation would 
not be implemented until after the Pacific War. A decree of February 1946 permitted 
directly ruled areas to be converted to autonomous areas; this transformation was
12 Gerry van Klinken, "Dayak Ethnogenesis and Conservative Politics in Indonesia's Outer Islands," in 
Indonesia in Transition: Rethinking "Civil Society," "Region," and "Crisis," ed. Henk Schulte Nordholt and 
Hanneman Samuel (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2004), pp. 107-28, available at
www.knaw.nl/indonesia/agenda/agendoc8.html.
13 Dayak reserves continued to exist in Indonesian forestry preserves for some time after independence, 
but the details are unclear to me. See Tjilik Riwut, Kalimantan Membangun: Alam Dan Kebudayaan 
(Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 1993), pp. 293-94.
14 Robert Cribb, Historical Atlas o f Indonesia (Surrey, UK: Curzon, 2000), p. 124.
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carried out by treating each of these entities like a traditional, self-ruled area, as 
defined in the 1938 Regulation.15 The process boiled down to artificially shaping a local 
political community in accordance with a concept of "custom," as "custom" was 
understood in 1946. This legal device opened the door to the next state-building action 
in the Dayak interior. After their return following the defeat of the Japanese, the Dutch 
faced a serious state-building problem. The revolutionary Republic of Indonesia had 
seized upon a momentary power vacuum following the Japanese surrender in August 
1945 to build an effective government in Java and parts of Sumatra. Republican 
sentiments burst out across the archipelago. Divide and rule was the Dutch solution to 
this problem. Their chief strategist, Lieutenant Governor-General Van Mook, set 
energetically to work creating ethnic units in relatively small autonomous territories 
surrounding the republican heartlands. "When Java proved to be a problem child," 
wrote the historian Yong Mun Cheong, "Van Mook began to think of Borneo and the 
Great East."16
However, diversity itself implied the need for diverse negotiating strategies. Van 
Mook's approaches in the outer island regions varied markedly. In the Great East 
(Sulawesi and eastwards), he started building a state structure from the top down, 
whereas in Borneo he took all the different ethnic entities into his negotiations. These 
entities had become reified through the colonial policy of the previous fifty years, as 
illustrated in the story of Hausmann Baboe. In the end, Van Mook's Borneo politics 
proved less than effective. The Sultan of Pontianak pushed so hard for special 
privileges that he alienated the other players, who began demanding more as well. The 
result was that Van Mook's original concept of a single state of Borneo became 
fragmented into numerous impotent statelets. However, the Dutch intention in Borneo 
at this time was not to reestablish real governance in the interior, which remained 
wretched and neglected since the departure of the Japanese.17 Rather their state­
building campaign in Borneo had a strategic aim: they wished to build a political fence 
of pro-Dutch sentiment around the republican-minded Banjarmasin and Hulu Sungei 
areas, which lay to the south and east of the Dayak lands.18
The Dutch began seriously to rally forces in the outer islands toward the middle of 
1946. Faithful to colonial tradition, they held separate conferences for different racial 
groups. One in Malino (South Sulawesi) for Indonesians was held in July 1946, and 
another in Pangkal Pinang (Bangka Belitung) for Europeans and Alien Orientals took
15 Naar De Nieuwe Rechtsorde in Indonesia Bouwstoffen Voor De Federatie, 2 vols. (Batavia: uitg. in opdracht 
van de Voorlopige Federale Regering van Indonesia, 1948), pp. 26-27.
16 Yong Mun Cheong, H. }. Van Mook and Indonesian Independence: A Study o f His Role in Dutch-Indonesian 
Relations, 1945-48 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), p. 59.
17 Just how wretched conditions were became clear during a visit to the interior in March 1948 by Resident 
Deelman of South Borneo. He traveled up the Katingan River as far as Tumbang Samba. It was the first 
Dutch official visit since 1932. He wrote: "Without exaggeration, I would call conditions alarming. No 
textiles, corruption in textile distribution, not a grain of salt, the salt barns entirely empty, a corrupt district 
government, no transport, no medical means, the population like twenty years ago nearly all clothed in 
tree bark again and apathetic; children with swollen bellies (worms?), a great deal of malaria, dysentery, 
and worst of all a tremendous amount of framboesia (footnote: the doctor accompanying me came to the 
conclusion that 25 percent of the population was afflicted with framboesia, among them a very large 
number of tertiary cases) ... The circumstances are such that I am ashamed as a representative of the 
government to show my face here." S. L. van der Wal, ed., Officiele Bescheiden Betreffende De Nederlands- 
Indonesische Betrekkingen, 1945-1950, 20 vols. ('s-Gravenhage: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 
1982), XIII: 212-15.
18 Ibid., VIIL330-34, 481.
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place the following October. The conferences aimed to formulate the shape of a Dutch- 
led Indonesian federation. Conference organizers invited participants along ethnic 
corporatist lines rather than based on the size of the population they represented. 
Experience had taught them that smaller groups were more pliable than larger ones. 
Particular care was taken at Malino to avoid inviting cosmopolitans with extensive 
experience of Java, for the Dutch organizers feared such people might have fallen 
under the influence of "ideologies" and could cause unnecessary confusion among 
their "tribal relations."19 The Dutch-colonial mistrust of all political parties found a 
fresh outlet during this anxious period for the imperial Dutch. They described the 
Indonesian nationalist parties as leftist organizations of propaganda and intimidation, 
whose members would decide the future of Borneo "over the heads" of the politically 
unorganized population.20
Opinion at the Malino conference ranged from pro-Dutch to pro-republican. 
Dayaks stood at the pro-Dutch end of the spectrum. Along with Torajanese and 
Papuans, they were, according to the Dutch reporter, "backward minorities seeking 
protection." Christian Manadonese took this position as well. At the Republican end 
were Banjar ethnic leaders from Banjarmasin in South Borneo. In between, other 
regional representatives adopted various compromise positions.
The Dayak representative who was part of a delegation of three people from South 
Borneo at Malino was Raden Cyrillus Kersanegara.21 He was a native district chief in 
Pangkalan Bun, located within the coastal principality of Kotawaringin, well to the 
west of Banjarmasin.22 Hausmann Baboe had once put him forward as the Dayak 
candidate for the Volksraad in 1926, when Cyrillus was still a young paramedical 
student in Surabaya. Despite being a representative of a "backward minority seeking 
protection," in 1946 Cyrillus refused to perform his role as an obediently abject 
dependent. He said he would cooperate with any Dutch proposal as long as Dayaks 
got their own administrative region.23 The conference recommended dividing Borneo 
into three autonomous regions (daerah), namely West, South, and East Borneo. The 
royal houses of Pontianak and Kutai were prominent in the West and East, while 
ethnic Banjar had a Banjar Council in the South. Thus Cyrillus's opinion bore little 
weight. Ultimately the conference merely recognized the establishment of a fourth 
region in the Dayak interior as a possibility that might be undertaken at a later date.24
Less than six months later, the growing threat of republicanism in central Borneo 
forced the Dutch to improve their offer. Dayaks got what they wanted. The legal 
instruments used to accomplish this were the previously mentioned 1938 Regulation 
and the 1946 decree on indirect rule. These converted the hitherto directly ruled parts 
of Borneo into several "neo-self-governing lands" (or "neo-lands"). One of them was 
the Greater Dayak region (Groot Dajak). Its constitutional status was inferior to that of a 
federal state, but the intention was that it would move towards statehood. Its 
demographic heartland lay north of Banjarmasin, in the middle reaches of the area
19 Ibid., IV:308-9.
20 Ibid., XI:71.
21 Ibid., XIV:375-81. A poor photograph of him is in W. A. van Goudoever, Malino Maakt Historie (Batavia: 
Regeerings Voorlichtingsdienst, 1946), p. 18.
22 Yong Mun Cheong, H .}. Van Mook and Indonesian Independence, p. 88.
23 Goudoever, Malino Maakt Historie, p. 32.
24 Ibid., pp. 56-57.
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bounded by the Barito and Kahayan Rivers and mainly inhabited by Ngaju Dayak.25 
Westwards it bordered on the small "self-ruled" sultanate of Kotawaringin. When the 
sickly sultan of the Kotawaringin was deposed in mid-1949, Dayaks argued in vain 
that, based on historical precedent, Kotawaringin should join Greater Dayak. (They 
eventually pursued this claim with more success in 1957.)26
The Dutch resident appointed a governing council (Groot Dajakraad) in December 
1946, which started working the following March.27 Funds to support its budget were 
generated by a timber operation of dubious legality. In exchange for awarding a huge 
concession to the largest timber operation in Southeast Asia, the council was given a 
substantial share in the company, which was run by (ex-) soldiers of the colonial 
army-28
The Greater Dayak region was inhabited by a uniformly rural population of 
340,000 people. About 70 percent of them were Ngaju Dayak from the catchment areas 
of the Kapuas and Kahayan Rivers.29 The remaining ethnic groups were each thought 
to number fewer than 30,000—all Dayak except for the Banjar. Despite an intensive 
missionary effort, only 6 percent of the population in this area was Christian; in this 
way, they differed from Dayaks in West Borneo who had converted to Christianity in 
larger numbers. The non-Christian majority was evenly divided between Muslims and 
"heathens" (later called Kaharingan). Nevertheless, the better educated "Christian- 
Dayaks" (always referred to in this manner in colonial correspondence) had a 
disproportionate influence on Dayak affairs in the period under discussion.
When in December 1948 elections were finally held for representatives who would 
constitute the Greater Dayak Council, the Dutch were relieved to note that its nineteen 
elected members were chosen with almost no influence from political parties. The 
small Serikat Kerakjatan Indonesia party (SKI), republican and based in South Borneo, 
was the one, weakly organized, exception.30 On the whole, Dayaks chose people they 
(or the Dutch) "trusted." Nearly half of those elected to the Greater Dayak Council 
belonged to demang families, a Dayak class of local bureaucrats created by the Dutch.
25 Cribb, Historical Atlas o f Indonesia, p. 160.
26 Wal, ed., Ojficiele Bescheiden, V:23.
27 Naar De Nieuwe Rechtsorde in Indonesia, p. 28.
28 Bruynzeel Dajak Houtbedrijven N.V. was a technology-intensive Dutch operation. The Greater Dayak 
Council 'awarded' the company a timber concession one and a half times the geographical size of the 
Netherlands in exchange for the shares. These shares later passed to the Republic of Indonesia in Jakarta, 
where they were managed by the politicians Mahir Mahar, I. J. Kasimo, and Quaggo (? -  original poorly 
legible). In the mid-1950s, it employed over a thousand men, mostly ex-soldiers who had belonged to the 
colonial and the Dutch army KNIL/KL (Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger, Royal Netherlands Indies 
Army, and Koninklijk Leger, Royal Army [of the Netherlands]). A report in Indonesia Raja in May 1954 
showed that its massive financial losses in recent years had been largely due to corruption rather than the 
costs of repairing wartime damage. By this time, the enterprise was 85 percent owned by the Indonesian 
government. Regent Tjilik Riwut presumably nationalized the remaining 15 percent. See Nederlands 
Commissariaat Te Bandjarmasin (Indonesia) 1951-1957, Nationaal Archief, ingang 2.05.61.02, 
geheimarchief inv. nr. 83 (politiek) & geheimarchief inv. nr. 82 (dienstrijzen), 1951-1957, May 29,1954
('s Gravenhage: Nationaal Archief, n.d.); and Indonesia Berdjuang, May 12 and 15,1954.
29 Wal, ed., Ojficiele Bescheiden, XVI: 465-68.
30 Dutch reports mention only three parties in South Borneo in late 1948: SKI, Sermi, and SRI. None was of 
national scope, and they organized only in larger urban centers. SKI (Serikat Kerakjatan Indonesia, 
Indonesian People's Union) and Sermi (Serikat Muslim Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Union) were 
republican, but had by this time abandoned their earlier noncooperative stance towards Dutch-led 
federalism; SRI (Sarikat Rajat Islam) was Islamic and federalist. Ibid., XL70-72.
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In a remarkable illustration of post-coloniality, this class of appointed elites was 
already regarded as a hereditary aristocracy less than fifty years after its creation.31 
Ethnically divided communities chose "neutral" outsiders—usually the local 
government administrator (known as kiai). The absence of political parties had 
produced a government that fitted nicely with the Dutch concept of self-rule—rule by 
aristocrats and administrators, untainted by "ideology."32
Even the Dutch soon recognized that no one on the ground was really interested in 
this powerless council.33 Until its demise in 1949, the Greater Dayak Council would 
meet in non-Dayak Banjarmasin because it could not decide where to locate its capital. 
Its Dutch minders complained quietly about a "lack of intellectuals" in the group.34 
Cyrillus was taken along to various diplomatic functions as a third-tier "advisor."35 
When Mochran bin Hadji Mohammad Ali replaced him in early 1949, he was no more 
vocal or effective than his precedessor.36Nevertheless, this ineffective creation born of a 
crisis in the state had set a precedent, at least establishing the concept of Dayak 
territoriality.
After mid-1947, Van Mook's reports to The Hague began to acknowledge he could 
not stem the growing tide of republican sentiment in the Dutch-held areas.37 The 
establishment of Greater Dayak had been one of the small Dutch victories against a 
well-organized assault from the Indonesian Republic, the others being the 
establishment of Eastern Indonesia (NIT, Negara Indonesia Timur), West Borneo, East 
Borneo, and Bangka Belitung. But republican guerrilla fighters led by Hasan Basry 
were by early 1949 making significant inroads in South Borneo, especially in the Banjar 
area of Hulu Sungei, bordering the Dayak Dusun lands.38 Rather than recognizing 
them as nationalist republicans, however, Dutch authorities made much of the rebels' 
Islamic religion. They pressured the "Christian-Dayak" village heads to form militias 
against them. It seems the so-called Lawong Army (Tentara Lawong/Laung), 
discussed below, had its origins in this period.39 Resident A. G. Deelman thought this 
ethnic-religious strife, so artificially stirred up, was regrettable but had a salutary side 
effect. The threat from Islamic (not to say republican) Banjar was strengthening Dayak 
ethnic feeling. "It has had a clearly visible stimulating influence on the 'Dayak reveille' 
already noted before the war, as well as on the accompanying feelings of solidarity of 
this ethnic group," he wrote.40
31 Van Klinken, "Dayak Ethnogenesis and Conservative Politics in Indonesia's Outer Islands."
32 Cyrillus was the key Dayak on the first, appointed council of December 1946. A less active member was 
Mahir Mahar, Hausmann Baboe's nephew. Cyrillus was not successful in the election two years later; the 
new chairman was the freshly elected Mochran bin Hadji Mohammad Ali, native district chief in Barabai. 
See Wal, ed., Officiele Bescheiden, XVIL332-34. Mochran's deputy chairman was H. Koenoem. Ibid., XIX:487- 
48. The council always acted under the patronizing supervision of the Dutch controleur for Sampit, J. Dijk. 
Ibid., XIV:375-81, and XIX:778.
33 Ibid., XI:72.
34 Ibid., XIX: 383-86.
35 Ibid., XV:144 and XVL29.
36 Ibid., XVII:332-334, 357-62 and XIX:778.
37 Ibid., IX:363-81.
38 Hasan Basry was a Kandangan-born resistance fighter, and commander of the republican armed forces 
in Kalimantan (ALRI Division IV Kalimantan) based in Hulu Sungei.
39 Ibid., XVII:686-89 and XVUL369; Nederlands Commissariaat, November 12,1953.
40 Wal, ed., Officiele Bescheiden, XVIII:500-503.
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The final blow to the Greater Dayak Council was a diplomatic one dealt by Hasan 
Basry. Resident Deelman had asked Mochran and his Banjar Council counterpart, 
Hanafiah, to travel to Jakarta in May 1949 to try to counter republican support for the 
Hasan Basry guerrillas.41 But no one in Jakarta was impressed with their arguments, 
and the trip only succeeded in demonstrating how ineffective the two pro-Dutch 
council members from Banjarmasin were. Seeing an opportunity to outmaneuver 
Deelman, who had obviously dealt these representatives such a weak hand, Hasan 
Basry invited them in August 1949 to take their seat on the republican National 
Committee in Jakarta. Doubtless fearing for their future if they were to hold out for the 
Dutch, they accepted. On August 17, Indonesian Independence Day, Hasan Basry 
declared that both the Banjar and Dayak Councils had been dissolved and replaced by 
the National Council.42 In this way, he checkmated the Dutch strategy of encouraging 
decentralized governance. At least for the time being, Greater Dayak had died. On 
December 27, 1949, the Dutch officially recognized Indonesian (federal) sovereignty 
over almost the entire former colonial territory. One by one, throughout the following 
year, the federal territories dissolved themselves and merged with the centralized 
republic. Indonesia entered a period of centralized rule, although it was to prove short­
lived.
Independence and the Campaign for Central Kalimantan
For a time it seemed as if the prestige of the centralizing national revolution, 
committed to the unitary state of Indonesia, would sweep all local politics before it. 
That the heavily outnumbered Dayak minority managed in 1957 to get a province they 
could call their own anyway was due to the emergence of a set of state-building 
dynamics similar to those we have just described. The government in Jakarta was no 
longer Dutch, but Indonesian, and the state-building crisis came this time not from 
republican guerrillas but from the Darul Islam (House of Islam) revolt. As in 1945-49, 
the problem facing the national government in the early 1950s was that the center was 
too weak to handle a serious armed revolt in several regions of the country at once. In 
each case, military capacity alone was not enough to restore control. Instead, the 
Indonesian national government attempted to expand state capacities by seeking loyal 
partners in the periphery. It developed alliances with power brokers in peripheral 
regions bordering those affected by the revolt. These flanking movements were not 
created by organized popular pressure. Political parties were marginal at all times. The 
alliances brought together security-oriented elites in the capital and ambitious state 
functionaries in the provinces. The latter were often the same people who, under the 
federalizing Dutch only a few years earlier, had been encouraged to mobilize followers 
on the basis of ethnicity.
World War II and the subsequent revolution had decimated local government in 
Borneo. When the numerous federal and sub-federal units were abolished in 1950, 
Borneo was left without any provincial government until 1953, although there were 
regencies (kabupaten) that corresponded with the late-colonial subdistricts (afdeelingen). 
Even then, Indonesian Borneo constituted only a single province, with its capital in
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., XIX:487-88, 721.
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Banjarmasin. From the beginning there were demands from the Indonesian regions for 
the creation of new provinces, but it took the outbreak of two serious revolts to move 
Jakarta to respond to them.
The first was Darul Islam, a popular revolt that started in West Java in 1948 but that 
spawned similar movements in Aceh, South Sulawesi, and southern Borneo after 
1950.43 In Borneo the insurgency styled itself as KRJT (Kesatuan Rakjat Jang Tertindas), 
the People's Division of the Oppressed, and was led by Ibnu Hadjar. Many of its 
members were former republican guerrillas who had failed to make the grade to be 
admitted into the Indonesian armed forces. Its heartland was Hulu Sungei, the mainly 
Banjar area that had also served as a base for the guerrillas. Related groups operated 
also in Dayak lands, including one near Sampit led by Suriansjah. KRJT conducted a 
violent campaign that proved difficult for the military to suppress. It reached the 
height of its powers in 1954.
The second revolt, referred to in abbreviation as Permesta/PRRI, was a more elite 
affair conducted by military officers in the regions beyond Java in late 1956 and 1957. It 
was backed by local business interests and also by the United States, which was 
concerned about growing leftism in the Jakarta government.44 Rebel Indonesian 
military commanders declared states of emergency in their respective military areas in 
Sumatra and Sulawesi and cut off relations with Jakarta.
A major element in Jakarta's response to these crises of authority was the formation 
of new provinces. Others were a parallel subdivision of military areas into smaller 
units, and the use of military force from Java to suppress rebellion. In effect, areas that 
under the Dutch had been residencies now became provinces. By contrast, the 
economic policies that were a major cause of the unease in the export-driven outer 
island economies were not corrected.45 The following section shows how this 
bureaucratic intensification was conducted in the case of Central Kalimantan, and the 
role that ethnic identity claims played in it.
From the beginning, those who sought to promote the establishment of a Central 
Kalimantan province described it as another Greater Dayak, and they justified its 
creation in the same ethnic terms. The first group to catch the attention of the press 
with a demand for a "Dayak" province was the Indonesian Dayak Kaharingan Society 
(SKDI, Serikat Kaharingan Dajak Indonesia), which had been formed in 1950.46 Their 
demands were first issued publicly in July 1953, just as the province of Kalimantan was
43 C. van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner o f  Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1981); Esther Velthoen, "Mapping Sulawesi in the 1950s," in Indonesia in Transition: Work in Progress, ed. 
Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gush Asnan (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2003), pp. 103-23. Most scholarly 
work on Darul Islam emphasizes its leadership rather than its popular elements. Velthoen by contrast 
describes it, in part, as an alternative moral economy stressing equality and a rejection of "city luxuries."
44 Permesta: Piagam Perdjuangan Semesta Alam, Universal Struggle Charter; PRRI: Pemerintahan 
Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia. See Audrey R. 
Kahin and George McT. Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in 
Indonesia (New York, NY: The New Press, 1995).
45 Howard Dick, "A  Bizarre Economy: Multiple Exchange Rates, Business Networks and Center-Region 
Relations in 1950s Indonesia," Paper, 3rd International Conference and Workshop on "Indonesia in 
Transition" (Depok, Jakarta: University of Indonesia, 2003).
46 Anne Schiller, "Religion and Identity in Central Kalimantan: The Case of the Ngaju Dayaks," in 
Indigenous Peoples and the State: Politics, Land, and Ethnicity in the Malayan Peninsula and Borneo, ed. Robert L. 
Winzeler (New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1997), pp.180-200.
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being established.47 Calls for "self-determination" had helped win Indonesia its 
independence, and this was now the term Dayaks preferred to describe the motive 
behind their own cause. Even the socialist newspaper, Indonesia Berdjuang, in 
Banjarmasin, adopted this term in a sympathetic editorial about Central Kalimantan 
published in February 1954 (the editorial did caution that self-determination should 
play out "within an independent Republic of Indonesia").48
In February 1954, the cabinet in Jakarta announced it was preparing to divide 
Kalimantan into three provinces.49 The plan thus looked like the proposal to establish 
three autonomous regions, which had been approved at the Dutch-led 1946 Mahno 
conference. Dayaks responded by demanding the addition of a fourth province. A 
People's Action Committee for Central Kalimantan (Panitia Aksi Rakjat Kalimantan 
Tengah) claimed at a meeting held in a Banjarmasin Christian high school that "all 
849" villages in the colonial entity, Greater Dayak, supported it.50 In Kuala Kapuas, 
meanwhile, political party representatives were asked to state publicly where they 
stood on the issue.51 The big nationalist parties responded by cautioning against 
"regionalism and tribalism" (this quote from PNI, Partai Nasional Indonesia, 
Indonesian National Party) and urging "national feeling among backward tribes" 
(quote attributed to PRB, sic, probably a misprint for PRN, Partai Rakjat Nasional, 
National People's Party). But several small or local parties with a following only in 
specific regions spoke enthusiastically about giving "life opportunities to life units in 
remote regions" (Acoma, Parkindo), and "privileging backward tribes like the 
Mentawai, Kubu, Toraja, Tengger, and others" (Somdi).52
Ethnic talk dismayed Jakarta's governor in Banjarmasin: Murdjani, a PNI man from 
Java. He was a determined modernizer who saw it as his life's work to bring economic 
development to Kalimantan and believed that ethnic differences would disappear as 
internal trade and traffic grew more intensive. From his perspective, the decision to 
divide Kalimantan into three provinces was a regrettable surrender to ethnic 
politicking. But he understood, too, that the state had failed to bring about the 
economic improvement the people of Kalimantan had a right to expect. His attempts to 
introduce reforms were frustrated by events and government failures. The cancellation 
through lack of funds of a large marsh drainage scheme (the Schophuys polder 
scheme) early in 1954 caused protests in rural areas outside Banjarmasin.53 Murdjani 
was incapacitated during this period by a recurring illness and then replaced in mid- 
1954 by Milono, also from Java. Liberal Banjarmasin press commentary at first 
portrayed Milono as a "feudalist," but his image improved when he began to work 
hard for the cause of establishing the new provinces.
Dayak activists were not alone in politicizing an ethnic idiom. In many other areas 
as well, for example northern Sumatra in 1956-57, activists expressed their demands
47 Indonesia Berdjuang, February 24,1955.
48 Indonesia Berdjuang, February 26,1954, and January 20,1954.
49 Indonesia Berdjuang, February 21,1954.
50 Indonesia Berdjuang, March 18,1954.
51 Indonesia Berdjuang March 31,1954, and April 4,1954.
52 Parkindo—Partai Kristen Indonesia, Indonesian Christian [i.e., Protestant] Party; Somdi and Acoma 
were local parties whose acronyms I was unable to unlock.
53 Nederlands Commissariaat, April 18,1954.
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for new provinces in ethnic terms.54 The Banjar were an exception. Indonesia Berdjuang 
always presented the issue of provincial politics not using the language of identity, but 
of liberal democracy. What was at stake, it often wrote, was breaking the monopoly of 
the Jakarta-appointed executive by means of a provincial parliament, which did not yet 
exist at that time. Nevertheless, Dayak activists understood that it was acceptable to 
advocate for their cause using ethnic terms so long as this rhetoric was confined to the 
local arena and did not enter the national discourse. In order to gain a hearing in 
Jakarta, it was necessary to avoid ethnic talk. Tjilik Riwut, the energetic and popular 
regent of Kotawaringin (since 1951), promoted the idea of establishing Central 
Kalimantan province among politicians in Jakarta by stressing the need to bring 
government services to the remote interior, while at the same time tactfully 
disavowing "destructive regionalism."55 Others supported the cause by citing issues of 
justice, arguing that those who had suffered most under Dutch colonialism deserved 
special attention.56
An obstacle to the creation of new provinces was their cost. The Interior Ministry 
told "me too" provincial hopefuls early in 1954 that creating new provinces in 
Kalimantan would mean doubling the current number of 40,000 bureaucrats in the 
region, and that each new province would require a start-up budget of Rp. 30 million. 
According to the ministry, if everyone who wanted a new province was to get one, it 
would seriously impede the government's effectiveness.57 However, statistics of this 
sort were more likely to stimulate than to hamper ambitions among provincial elites, 
who favored the expansion of local bureaucracy. As it happened, developments in the 
interior of the Dayak regions starting in 1953 eventually pulled the government over 
the line.
Christian Simbar and the Buntok Incident (1953)
The creation of the new province was largely accomplished through negotiations 
conducted out of public sight. The key negotiating techniques included direct lobbying 
efforts aimed at Jakarta, backed by stealthy force in the jungles of Kalimantan. The 
clandestine Dayak militia was intended both to put muscle into the demand for a 
Dayak province and to demonstrate loyalty to Jakarta by opposing anti-Jakarta Muslim 
rebels. Kalimantan-based activists portrayed the militia to politicians in Jakarta as the 
expression of a unique Dayak culture, savage but loyal. In fact, this militia already had 
a considerable history. The Tentara Lawong, as we have seen, was probably a Dutch- 
sponsored "Christian-Dayak" vigilante group originally formed to resist the 
penetration of Banjar republican guerrillas into the Dusun lands from Hulu Sungei to 
the southeast. It survived the transition to independence and turns up again in the 
written record in late 1953, when it was reportedly active in Tamiang Layang, just 
inside the Dusun lands and across from neighboring Hulu Sungei. It had become
54 Liddle, Ethnicity, Party, and National Integration.
55 Indonesia Berdjuang, February 4,1955, similarly Indonesia Berdjuang, April 7,1954.
56 Indonesia Berdjuang, April 18,1954.
57 Indonesia Berdjuang, March 20,1954.
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essentially a local group, no longer tied to a larger political purpose. Certainly no 
orthodox Christian organization, it engaged in an indigenous "mystical" cult.58
Christian Simbar was the most prominent leader of Tentara Lawong. He was 
secretary to the district chief (wedana or camat) in Buntok. This small riverside town in 
the Dayak Dusun lands lay about fifty kilometers northwest of Tamiang Layang. The 
armed group's main purpose was to defend local interests against hostile outsiders. It 
may even have had a vague association with Ibnu Hadjar's KRJT (the People's Division 
of the Oppressed), which, though allied to the Darul Islam, actually more closely 
resembled a nonreligious grassroots resistance movement opposed to state control.59
The enthusiastic support from the local population that Tentara Lawong enjoyed 
was due less to ideology than to its practice of robbing passing trading boats and 
distributing the proceeds, Robin Hood style, to those in need. Attackers from Tentara 
Lawong had robbed boats at Kurau, Negara, and finally at Kalahien, near Buntok. 
They acted like men of authority, wearing their government uniforms during the raids 
as well as during the distribution of the spoils that followed. But the incident in 
Kalahien in late 1953 was too much for the police, who subsequently arrested a number 
of Simbar's men for robbing the Chinese riverboat, Gin Wan II. Four of those arrested 
were Simbar's relatives, and he decided to strike back. Early on Sunday morning, 
November 22, 1953, Simbar and hundreds of his Dayak followers stormed the town of 
Buntok. They liberated their imprisoned mates, but in the process killed six policemen, 
as well as six members of police families, including three children.60 The acting district 
chief was among those murdered. The raiders then absconded with the weapons in the 
police armory.
The appearance of armed force in an area where no one monopolizes the means of 
violence is bound to interest others, too, notably those with a political stake in the 
region. Rather than becoming outlaws, Simbar and his gang were about to be coopted 
and transformed into a useful political commodity. At first, the militias attracted the 
attention of local groups who perceived them as a religious rather than as an ethnic 
force. Christian Dayaks in Banjarmasin, not anti-Indonesian by any means, saw them 
as potential allies against the Darul Islam, which posed a threat to their religion. 
Reports of attacks by Kahar Muzakkar's Darul Islam movement on Torajanese 
Christians in South Sulawesi were spreading fear throughout church congregations all 
over Indonesia. In Banjarmasin, in November 1953, Christoffel Mihing, a Dayak civil 
servant in Banjarmasin and a Christian, announced that he and his congregation were 
prepared to take up arms to support the Indonesian government and to protect 
themselves against forcible conversion to Islam.61 They wanted to contact the Tentara 
Lawong to design a "struggle program" together. Yet the Dayak militia was eventually 
drawn not into these religious politics, but into ethnic politics supporting the creation 
of a fourth Dayak province in Kalimantan, an issue that they were able to exploit 
because of Jakarta's state-building problem at the time. Immediately after the Buntok 
attack, unnamed, evidently Christian, Dayak leaders in Banjarmasin approached 
Governor Murdjani. These delegates, who had taken part in the Buntok attack,
58 Indonesia Berdjuang, November 26,1953.
59 Interview with T.T. Suan, Palangkaraya, May 12, 2003.
60 Indonesia Berdjuang, November 25,1953.
61 Nederlands Commissariaat, November 12, 1953.
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declared that they were not Ibnu Hadjar's rebels, but were acting in response to a long 
history of enmity between Islamic and Dayak groups. The lobbyists claimed to know 
the "culture and customs" of the Dayaks, which were "unique" and included a strong 
attachment to tribe and family. They recommended a "wise" resolution of the issue, by 
which they meant a resolution that would not involve prosecution of the militia. An 
Indonesia Berdjuang editorial agreed with these sentiments, and later reported with 
approval that the cabinet viewed the attack as criminal rather than political.62
The Buntok attack had been launched, the attackers now revealed in a letter, by a 
movement called Telabang Pantjasila Sektor Dajak. Telabang (or telawang) is a shield; 
Pantjasila was the Indonesian national ideology, a term that clearly conveyed loyalty to 
Jakarta. The attackers explained that they had been motivated by grievances, such as 
their dissatisfaction with government corruption and the cancellation of the marsh 
drainage scheme. The group added (no doubt with an eye to attracting potential 
sponsors in Jakarta) that it was ready "to die for" Pantjasila. The next day, the group 
rebaptized itself in even more florid, but slightly less overtly Dayak, terms as Mandau 
Telabang Pantjasila (mandau refers to a Dayak cutlass). It announced that its leader was 
Ch. Simbar, alias Mandolin, a Ma'anyan Dayak tribesman. Most importantly, it 
declared its opposition to the loosely allied anti-Jakarta rebel movements, KRJT, Darul 
Islam, and the Tentara Islam Indonesia.63
Simbar, the declared leader of this group, was clearly no pariah. He was a local 
government official now speaking out for many of his fellow officials in this Dayak 
area.64 At a long and sympathetic meeting in December 1953 with a high-powered 
delegation of Dayak notables led by the regent of Barito, G. Obus, Simbar put forward 
a remarkably ideological defense of his actions. He said he was driven by a sense of the 
injustices suffered by Dayaks, was opposed to corruption and to Islamic rebels, and 
that he and his men would surrender provided they were recruited into the police 
force or the army.65 Also present at this meeting was C. Luran, chairman of the Barito 
regency tentative assembly (DPRDS, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Sementara), 
who had been a member of Hausmann Baboe's Pakat Dayak executive in 1939.
A deal must have been made, for the next day Simbar surrendered along with 129 
of his followers.66 All were taken to Banjarmasin. Another high-level meeting followed 
there between Dayak leaders and the deputy governor, representatives of the police, 
and the prosecutor's office (mediated by district chief Barnstein Babu, a nephew of 
Hausmann Baboe).67 68Afterwards, most of the men who had taken part in the Buntok 
attack were released. The police, disinclined to take an entirely cavalier attitude to the 
law since some of their own men had been killed in the skirmish, did insist on 
detaining the ringleaders and charging them with the robbery on the Gin Wan II. But in 
mid-April 1954, Simbar simply walked out of detention and took a bus northwards in 
the direction of his homeland.® In August, the local government announced that all 
charges against Simbar and his associates had been dismissed. Still miffed, the police at
62 Indonesia Berdjuang, November 26 and 28,1953.
63 Indonesia Berdjuang, December 3,1953.
64 Indonesia Berdjuang, January 3,1954.
65 Indonesia Berdjuang, December 4,1953.
66 Indonesia Berdjuang, December 5 and 6,1953.
67 Indonesia Berdjuang, January 6,1954.
68 Indonesia Berdjuang, April 13,15, 23, and 24,1954; and Indonesia Berdjuang, May 23,1954.
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first insisted he had to pick up the dismissal letter in person, but in the end even that 
demand was dropped.®
Indonesia Berdjuang commentators soon smelled a rat, but dared name no names. 
Simbar could not have planned and carried out his own escape, but must have acted 
on orders, they wrote. The writers suggested that this was all part of a preelection ploy 
to counter the Islamic parties. Simbar's escape had been organized by "clandestine 
elements" in Banjarmasin, they claimed, and these same elements were now giving 
him weapons that might be put to use in the election.69 70
It is true that the prospect of national elections was already raising political 
tensions around the country in 1954, a year before they were eventually held. But the 
Simbar movement had little to do with electoral politics. Simbar was a pawn in an elite 
politics concerned with decentralized rule. At this time, the national cabinet was 
considering the division of Kalimantan into provinces. Dayak action committees were 
springing up to argue for the "fourth" province encompassing Greater Dayak. The best 
connected of them was the Committee to Channel the People's Aspirations for Central 
Kalimantan (Panitia Penjalur Hasrat Rakjat Kalimantan Tengah), led by Oberlin 
Brahim and M. Ismail.71 Oberlin's brother, Timmerman, was soon to form the Partai 
Persatuan Daya, while Ismail was the brother of the Parkindo leader and Banjarmasin 
judge, A. D. Ismail.
In June 1954, Simbar was back in the local headlines, once more identified as the 
leader of his armed organization named Telawang, Mandau dan Pantjasila (also 
sometimes referred to as "Telabang Mandau Dajak Kalimantan"). He was still based in 
the Barito River catchment area around Buntok and Muara Teweh.72 Two months later, 
he had reportedly walked 150 kilometers west into the Kahayan River catchment area, 
where he was providing "mystical knowledge" (ilmu) to Kaharingan and Christian 
Dayaks and urging them to join his armed force.73 "Thousands" responded, according 
to Indonesia Berdjuang. Simbar told the press that the formation of Central Kalimantan 
province by "democratic" means was an urgent issue, and he criticized the weak 
efforts that had been made in support of this cause by Dayak parliamentarian (and ex- 
Dayak Councillor), Halmoat Koenoem, in Jakarta.74
Simbar's genius lay in his ability to move back and forth at will between town and 
jungle, now playing the role of a Dayak electoral candidate, now that of armed 
guerrilla. In May 1955, apparently emerging from the jungle, he took his place as one 
of the top three candidates for the Partai Persatuan Daya.75
69 Indonesia Berdjuang, August 3,1954; Indonesia Berdjuang, September 8,1954.
70 Indonesia Berdjuang, December 8,1953, July 24,1954, and August 29,1954.
71 Indonesia Berdjuang, August 29,1954.
72 Indonesia Berdjuang, June 19,1954, August 19 and 27,1954.
73 It would be interesting to know if this ilmu recalled the memory of the nyuli movement prevalent among 
these Lawangan/ Luangan and Maanyan Dayaks in the 1920s. See W. K. H. Feuilletau de Bruyn, "De 
Njoeli Beweging in De Zuider En Oosterafdeeling Van Borneo," Koloniaal Tijdschrift 23 (1934): 41-65; 
Weinstock, "Kaharingan and the Luangan Dayaks," p. 148.
74 Indonesia Berdjuang, September 23,1954.
75 It seems Tentara Lawung remained active until at least 1955, not necessarily with Simbar in control. 
Continued atrocities committed by Darul Islam fighters against civilians led the government to sponsor 
local militias called Barisan Keamanan Kampung (BKK, Village Security Front, sometimes referred to as 
Barisan Keamanan Desa, BKD, Village Security Front, or Organisasi Keamanan Desa, OKD, Village 
Security Organization). They were given minimal training, after which they joined military patrols
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The 1955 Elections: A "Defeat" for Dayak Autonomy
The clearest evidence that the dream of establishing an ethnic fourth province in 
Kalimantan was limited to an urban elite is the fact that it failed to create electoral 
waves even in the three Dayak heartland regencies. As the new nation's first elections 
approached, the large parties spoke of national unity, human skills, and budgets. 
Advocates for Dayak autonomy did try the electoral avenue, but they found support 
only in three small parties. The Partai Rakjat Nasional (PRN, National Party of the 
People) had a minister in the national cabinet (Djody Gondokusumo, Justice). In March 
1954, this party held its annual national conference in Banjarmasin, and came out in 
support of the fourth province proposal.76 But less than a year later, the party split 
between a Jakarta faction that opposed significant concessions to the regions and 
another centered in its South Sulawesi homeland that supported them. Another was 
the small Protestant party, Parkindo, to which several leading Dayaks belonged, 
including the mission-educated Mahir Mahar. These were both national parties. The 
most promising potential ally, however, was the Partai Persatuan Daya. This was a 
specifically ethnic party, without national pretensions, set up shortly before the 
election in South Kalimantan by Timmerman Brahim. It was unrelated to a similarly 
named party in West Kalimantan.77
Dayaks in the electoral district of South Kalimantan were not united under an 
ethnic banner as the 1955 elections approached. This was not through lack of interest in 
regional politics or parties. Douglas Miles describes a high level of politicization of 
rural villages even in upriver areas during the run-up to the elections.78 But unlike 
West Kalimantan, where Dayaks did rally behind their ethnic party and won a seat in 
the national parliament, here they spread their support among many parties.79 Many 
Dayaks simply did not find Dayak ethnicity appealing as an exclusive political tag to 
mark their identity. Partai Persatuan Daya's key candidates were Timmerman Brahim, 
Perdinand Dahdan Leiden, and the aforementioned Christian Simbar, all based in 
Banjarmasin.80 Mahir Mahar, former member of the Greater Dayak Council and by this 
time a member of parliament in Jakarta, was put forward as a candidate by Parkindo. 
Mochran bin Hadji Mohammad Ali, another former Greater Dayak Council member 
and by now a Jakarta parliamentarian, stood as a candidate for Parindra (Partai
dispatched to search for the enemy. In the Bandjar area in May 1955, there were six hundred militia 
members: three hundred in Rantau, fifty in Amandit, twenty each in Bababai and Tandjung, and others 
operating elsewhere. (Nederlands Commissariaat, May 18,1955). Some of these militias had an ethnic 
character. In July 1955, a Dayak militia named Laung Kuning (its name resembles Tentara Laung 
[Lawung], but this group operated in Hulu Sungei itself rather than on its northwestern margin) was 
"legalized" as a BKK. Laung Kuning proved an effective force against Ibnu Hadjar's base in the Amandit 
mountains near Kandangan in the following months. See Indonesia Berdjuang, May 6,1955, July 5,1955, 
August 14,18 and 24,1955.
76 Nederlands Commissariaat, March 9,1954; Indonesia Berdjuang, February 12 and 17,1955.
77 Jamie Seth Davidson, "Violence and Politics in West Kalimantan, Indonesia" (PhD dissertation, 
University of Washington, 2002), p. 86.
78 Miles, Cutlass and Crescent Moon, p. 127.
79 Suluh Umum, May 1955, pp. 14-16; Indonesia Berdjuang, May 3,1955; Nederlands Commissariaat, July 9, 
1955.
80 Other Partai Persatuan Daya candidates were Adji Djaga Bahyn, Kristinus Wanden Wente (a 
Banjarmasin junior military officer), Mrs. Bahara Njangkal (head of a native primary school in 
Banjarmasin), Johannes Idjau, and Sikoer.
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Indonesia Raya, The Greater Indonesia Party). Matseman Usup, the father of K. M. A. 
Usop, who was to become such a significant Dayak leader after the early 1990s, was 
aligned with the PNI in Kuala Kapuas, though ranked so low that he had little chance 
of victory. Christoffel Mihing, the Dayak civil servant in Banjarmasin, though a 
member of PNI, stood as an independent. Finally, Tjilik Riwut, the high-profile regent 
of Kotawaringin and a former soldier, was the number-one candidate for the military 
party, IPKI (Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia, League of the Supporters of 
Indonesian Independence).
The results of the election for the South Kalimantan provisional provincial 
parliament (DPRD Peralihan), also held that year, confirmed just how ineffective ethnic 
Dayak electoral politics were. In South Kalimantan as a whole, 82 percent of the votes 
went to the two Islamic parties, Nahdatul Ulama (NU, 49 percent) and Masyumi (33 
percent). PNI took another 6 percent of the vote. None of these had expressed an 
interest in the creation of a fourth province. In what were thought to be the 
predominantly Dayak regencies of Barito, Kapuas, and Kotawaringin, the smaller 
parties made more of a showing, but not nearly enough to break the dominance of NU, 
Masyumi, and PNI. The big parties won a total of 70 percent, 52 percent, and 60 
percent in these three interior regencies, respectively. Those parties that had actively 
supported the establishment of a fourth province—Partai Persatuan Daya (Dayak 
Unity Party), PRN, and Parkindo—each won tiny portions of the vote, though 
Persatuan Daya, Simbar's party, certainly did well as a newcomer (Simbar's party 
won, respectively, 3 percent, 14 percent, and 3 percent of the total vote in each of the 
three regencies).81 This showing was not enough to persuade Simbar to stay with party 
politics, however, and he returned to his older tactics soon afterward.
Simbar Deploys Guerrilla Tactics Again
Having lost the election, Christian Simbar went back into the jungle in September 
1956, but he did not sever his links with the authorities. Much of his time was spent in 
his home area of Buntok and the northern part of Hulu Sungei, but he also ranged west 
to the Kahayan River.82 Douglas Miles presents evidence from the area around the 
upper Mentaya River (above Sampit, in Kotawaringin) indicating that Simbar enjoyed 
the cooperation of the military. Tjilik Riwut, who combined a role in the civil 
administration with his continued activities in the military, acted as his conduit and 
possibly his taskmaster.83 This allowed Simbar to act with impunity. His gang raided 
the military arsenal in Sampit on November 10, 1956.84 On December 6, he and his men 
attacked the township of Pahandut, at that time merely a district capital (kecamatan).85 
Two policemen were killed, and the district chief (camat) was among the three people
81 Election results calculated from Miles, Cutlass and Crescent Moon, p. 118; there are minor differences in 
the statistics listed by the Nederlands Commissariaat, August 25,1956. Miles fails to make clear that this 
set of election results was not for the national, but for the provincial, parliament.
82 Nederlands Commissariaat, September 24,1956; Harian Rakjat, December 25,1956.
83 Associates of Simbar still believe that A. H. Nasution had instructed Tjilik Riwut to set up a militia to 
create "a few ripples" in the Kalimantan interior in order to put pressure on Sukarno. This military 
connection explains, they say, why Simbar attacked only the police and not the military. Marko Mahin, 
personal communication, December 9, 2003.
84 Miles, Cutlass and Crescent Moon, pp. vii, 130-133.
85 Harian Rakjat, December 11,1956.
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injured. The gang allegedly burned houses, raped women, then ran off with gold and 
diamonds they had robbed from the locals, as well as materials stolen from 
government offices. The marauders headed north to Kuala Kurung, along the Kahayan 
River, apparently intent on a repeat performance. They always left leaflets in their 
wake—this was a modern movement!—promoting the creation of Central Kalimantan 
province, asserting Dayak commitment to Sukarno, and declaring opposition to an 
Islamic Indonesia.
Simbar's vigilantes gave the impression that they controlled most of the interior of 
the Kapuas regency. They openly held marching and shooting drills just a few 
kilometers outside the regency capital, Kuala Kapuas. The metropolitan press 
portrayed the entire interior as unsafe for boat travel, warning that Simbar would 
shoot at and rob passing trade and government boats. Meanwhile the Katingan River, 
the next catchment area to the west, was under the control of another gang leader 
called William Embang, whose force was allied with Simbar's.86 Together, these 
insurgents continued to call their movement Mandau Telabang Pantjasila Kalimantan. 
But in the interior, Simbar was not seen as a rebel. Local government leaders there 
seemed to support him. Embang also had official allies: the district chief of Kasungan, 
Embang's hometown, joined Embang in the forest for a time. When captured, he 
claimed Embang had kidnapped him, and all charges were dropped.87
Curiously, the Jakarta PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist 
Party) newspaper, Harian Rakjat, reported in December 1956 that Simbar and Embang's 
gang differed from other jungle militias because they never engaged in robbery. The 
journalist alleged that the gang had its own "prosecutor general," who severely 
punished any member caught thieving.88 Coming just a few days after the bloody 
attack on Pahandut, which had been reported in the same paper, this strange assertion 
was another hint that Simbar and Embang's elite connections now stretched all the 
way to Jakarta. And influence may have flowed both ways, for just as Simbar's late 
1953 attack on Buntok virtually coincided with the first discussions in the national 
cabinet about the creation of new provinces in Kalimantan, so his 1956 attack on 
Pahandut came just two months after the cabinet had once again considered the 
Kalimantan question, suggesting that perhaps his actions were being guided by 
shadowy figures in Jakarta.
The Creation of the New Province of Central Kalimantan
By late 1956, the Darul Islam rebellion had been seriously weakened. In South 
Kalimantan, many of Ibnu Hadjar's men had surrendered (though without handing 
over their weapons) and been rewarded with jobs in a state-owned rubber plantation.89 
But just then an even more serious threat erupted, as local military commanders staged 
increasingly serious acts of insubordination in several outer island regions as part of 
the Permesta/PRRI revolt. These disruptions occurred first in North Sumatra in 
November 1956, then in Central Sumatra and South Sumatra, and last in North
86 Harian Rakjat, December 25,1956.
87 Harian Rakjat, December 15,1956.
88 Harian Rakjat, December 25,1956.
89 Nederlands Commissariaat, November 19,1956.
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Sulawesi. Colonel Abimanju, the military commander of Kalimantan, appears to have 
sympathized with the rebels, though hesitantly and without burning his bridges to 
Jakarta.
By the end of 1956, army chief of staff General A. H. Nasution was the most 
powerful man in the country. Reports of his activities had been featured on the front 
page of all national papers every day for months, even before the Ali Sastroamidjojo 
cabinet resigned on March 14, 1957, at which time martial law was declared 
throughout Indonesia to deal with the PRRI/Permesta regional rebellion. The non- 
party "business" cabinet that replaced Sastroamidjojo's cabinet was overshadowed by 
Nasution. It announced that resolving the regional problems was its main priority. The 
most important element in its political strategy was to build support by creating new 
provinces. Cost was now much less of a consideration. In fact, this approach had 
already been initiated with the creation of Aceh province the previous September, 
when Aceh had been separated from North Sumatra province, designated as a Special 
Region (Daerah Istimewa), and granted a degree of autonomy. Many more provinces 
were to follow, but none gained such significant autonomy as did Aceh. In these 
provinces, decentralization meant deconcentration of government administrative tasks, 
but not devolution of authority. It did not matter. Those who wanted the new 
provinces to be created were more interested in the promise of jobs and money, which 
they hoped would revive their crisis-ridden economies, than in political autonomy. 
The abject delegations traveling to Jakarta made it clear to Nasution and to anyone else 
who would listen that they condemned rebellious activity.
The communist-nationalist political party, Murba, which aimed to support 
President Sukarno by opposing Islamicism and regionalism, contributed to the new 
strategy by organizing a series of "people's congresses" around the country. The All 
Indonesia Congress, under the leadership of the Murba-leaning A. M. Hanafi, 
sponsored many regional meetings around this time. Speakers at these events often 
began by expressing their support for the government in Jakarta and ended by asking 
for provincial status. One such congress for Central Kalimantan, chaired by Mahir 
Mahar, was held in Banjarmasin in December 1956. It attracted six hundred 
participants, including Governor Milono. It urged the speedy establishment of a 
Central Kalimantan province while nominally renouncing Simbar and Embang's 
"undemocratic" movement.90 East Sumatra also demanded to be recognized as a 
province at about this time, as did Tapanuli, Bangka, and Lampung.91 Picking and 
choosing among these supplicants as its own state-building needs dictated, Jakarta 
refused some but accepted others. Among the victors were South, Central, Southeast 
and North Sulawesi, Jambi, West Sumatra, and Riau.92 Maluku was changed from an 
"administrative" to an "autonomous" province the same year, and NusaTenggara was 
split into three provinces the following year.
Preparations to subdivide Kalimantan into three parts had been inching along since 
early 1954, but the implementation date was now set for January 1, 1957. This plan 
made no provision for the establishment of a Central Kalimantan province, however.
90 Ibid., December 12,1956.
91 Merdeka, January 12,1957; February 19,1957; April 20,1957; and June 26,1957.
92 J. D. Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: A Study in Local Administration, 1950- 
1960 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1961), pp. 66-68.
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Kotawaringin's regent, Tjilik Riwut, therefore sent urgent telegrams to Jakarta in 
October 1956, calling for the creation of Central Kalimantan. Perhaps to his own 
surprise, he now found ready listeners. The PKI came out in support of Central 
Kalimantan, despite its stated dislike of the "tribalism" (rasa kesukuan) inherent in so 
much provincial politicking.93 A desire to put arch-rival Masyumi in its place by 
appropriating most of its territory in South Kalimantan clearly played a role in the 
PIC's response. No doubt Tjilik Riwut's military connections were also put to good 
use. He could show the Jakarta politicians a photograph of himself, barefoot and gun 
in hand, personally leading an expedition against the KRJT in his area.94 As a result, the 
main government party, PNI, agreed in October 1956 that Central Kalimantan would 
get its own province within three years.95
Tjilik Riwut became the key player in the culminating phase of this small provincial 
struggle. He was dispatched early in the new year to an office in Banjarmasin to 
prepare for the establishment of the new province of Central Kalimantan, working 
under the leadership of Governor Milono, who had been governor of all Kalimantan.96 
The proposed three-year wait was too long for these men. The opportunity to whittle it 
down came when Jakarta declared martial law in March. Tjilik Riwut and Milono set 
off for Jakarta once more to argue their case. Milono, who had managed to slough off 
his early image as an outsider governor imposed on the people by Jakarta, 
enthusiastically vowed that he would not return empty-handed.97 98The issue of Central 
Kalimantan was no doubt on the agenda of an important military meeting set to 
discuss martial law and regional autonomy in mid-April 1957.m
Security conditions in the region were now "ideal," Tjilik Riwut and the new 
military commander of Kalimantan declared.99 Indeed, after having done his part, 
Simbar had been eased out of the picture. He and Embang came out of the jungle and 
were taken to meet acting Kalimantan governor, Sarkawie, and his entourage in 
Banjarmasin in March. Simbar told them he had "ten thousand" men committed to him 
all over Central Kalimantan. The group then travelled together to Buntok and to 
Bundar to witness four hundred Tentara Lawong members in each place take a 
symbolic oath of loyalty to the state.100 The following month, the gang members 
figured as guests of honor at official celebrations repeated in each of the three regencies 
that were to join the province. Simbar and Embang's gangs were rebaptized the Youth 
Front for the Development of Central Kalimantan; the group was still led by Simbar, 
who was subsequently counted among the heroes of Central Kalimantan.101
93 Harian Rakjat, October 15, 24, 25 and 26,1956; see also, Harian Rakjat, February 12,1957 on Central 
Sulawesi.
94 Indonesia Berdjuang, January 30,1955.
95 Harian Rakjat, October 26,1956.
96 Merdeka, April 6,1957.
97 Merdeka, April 9,1957; Merdeka, May 7,1957.
98 Merdeka, April 13 and 29,1957.
99 Merdeka, April 16,1957.
100 Merdeka, February 23,1957; Merdeka, March 1, 25, and 26,1957.
101 Riwut, Kalimantan Membangun, p. 62; K. M. A. Usop, Pakat Dayak: Sejarah Integrasi Dan Jatidiri Masyarakat 
Dayak Daerah Kalimantan Tengah (Palangkaraya: Yayasan Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Batang Garing, 
1996), p. 82.
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The Losers and the Winner
A list of gubernatorial hopefuls for the new province that circulated in Banjarmasin 
around this time indicates who was considered worthy of leading the region.102 The 
memory of Hausmann Baboe, the father of Dayak ethnic self-awareness, who had been 
executed by the Japanese, apparently still reigned supreme in politicized Dayak circles. 
The name of his son, Ruslan Babu, by this time a consul for the Republic of Indonesia 
in San Francisco, appeared on the list. Another son, the trader Alfons Babu, had earlier 
been put forward as a candidate in the first flush of excitement about the province in 
1954.103 Christoffel Mihing, the Banjarmasin civil servant who had wanted to send his 
Christian church into battle against the Darul Islam forces, had chaired the council of 
the Central Kalimantan People's Congress the previous December; he was named as a 
possible candidate. There was also Mahir Mahar, who had served on the Greater 
Dayak Council under the Dutch. G. Obus was listed; Obus was the regent of Barito 
who had given Simbar a voice in the national media in 1954. Another potential 
candidate, A. D. Ismail, was the leader of the Protestant party Parkindo that had 
supported the province from the start. Only J. M. Nahan, a Ma'anyan Dayak, was a 
relative unknown. None of these men was ultimately elected as governor, but no 
aspirant for office was disappointed, either. All the other players were rewarded with 
one of the numerous official positions that now opened up; they took their places in a 
variety of posts ranging from bank manager to assembly chairman.104
The front runner for governor and eventual victor proved to be Tjilik Riwut, who 
was at that moment putting the finishing touches to the new administration. Tjilik was 
charismatic, and he had a convincing record. Educated as a paramedic, he had fought 
as a republican guerrilla in the interior of Borneo. In 1955, as Kotawaringin district 
chief, he nationalized the Bruynzeel timber operation. He was also a prolific author.105 
In 1954, he had submitted his own proposal for a new province, to be called South 
Kalimantan, with Sampit as its capital.106 Dayaks had poured into Sampit to express 
their support, and a committee of "Kotawaringin Dayaks" had been formed to 
promote the idea.107 After some months, during which Milono was acting governor, 
Tjilik Riwut became the first Dayak governor of Central Kalimantan; his tenure as 
governor would last ten years, from 1957 to 1967. Dayaks held the position until 1984, 
when at the height of the New Order the governorship was taken over by outsiders.
The capital was to be built at Pahandut. Tjilik Riwut had argued sensibly for 
Sampit because of its decent deepwater harbor and the nearby Bruynzeel timber 
operation. But the bureaucratically oriented Central Kalimantan activists argued in 
support of this small village, Pahandut, which boasted only an abandoned Japanese 
airstrip, in romantic terms. Pahandut was appropriate as a "cultural center," they said. 
What's more, it was not afflicted with Sampit's "harbor city mentality."108 Also, it was 
the homeland of the mission-educated core group who had fought for the province.
102 Merdeka, April 27,1957.
103 Indonesia Berdjuang, April 21,1954.
104 Many names are listed in Tjilik Riwut, Memperkenalkan Kalimantan Tengah Dan Pembangunan Kota 
"Palangka Raja" (Palangka Raja: n.p., 1962).
105 Personal communication, P. M. Laksono, who has researched Riwut's biography, July 27, 2004.
106 Indonesia Berdjuang, April 1 and 3,1954.
107 Indonesia Berdjuang, May 18,1954, August 12,1954.
108 Nederlands Commissariaat, March 18,1957; Merdeka, May 7,1957.
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The government-financed construction boom soon to come would no doubt benefit 
everyone.109
Simbar was set up with some money and went into business. He had little talent for 
business, however, and went bankrupt. In 1961, he returned to the jungle, still 
imagining that he had pioneered the only route to political success (while conveniently 
forgetting the contributions of those who had tirelessly lobbied Jakarta). He had been 
passed over for governor after Tjilik Riwut's term expired, and this angered him. 
Perhaps he did not realize that he had lost influence and, for that reason, immunity 
from the law. Simbar was captured and died under mysterious circumstances shortly 
after being released from military detention in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan. The 
authorities had not forgotten their own cohorts who had suffered death at his hands, 
and many suspect he was executed.110 Simbar had become dispensable. Embang, by 
contrast, lived to old age in Palangkaraya.
Afterthought
The formation of Central Kalimantan province is not a major story in Indonesia's 
history, nor a particularly glorious one. But it is interesting because it gives us a 
glimpse of a dynamic that has again become important. After the collapse of the New 
Order in 1998, a weakened Jakarta created a large number of new districts and 
provinces, many of them carved out along ethnic lines. The dynamics that characterize 
ethnically charged local politics have often been misinterpreted. In the story of 
Kalimantan, at least, the campaign to claim more autonomy for the provinces was not 
so much the work of rebels as it was part of a loyalist movement among junior civil 
servants. Insofar as "unruly" guerrilla fighters were involved in the struggle for a 
separate province, they ultimately figured as pawns manipulated by the more 
important players. The move to create new provinces was the sharp end, as it were, of 
a bureaucratic state extending itself and at the same time being drawn into the 
remotest territories of the archipelago. The images this campaign invoked to establish 
group identity and allegiance were, moreover, not "natural," ancient ones, but quite 
recent inventions. In the hands of those who politicized them, these images were 
associated less with autonomy than with conformity, and less with self-determination 
and democracy than with expanding an administrative machine.
During his visit to Palangkaraya in July 1957, when he came to lay the foundation 
stone for the new provincial capital, President Sukarno unwittingly gave his blessing 
to an ethnically delineated form of provincial statecraft that embodied the "tribalism 
and separatism" he had passionately warned against.111 The ethnic qualities of the 
savage but loyal native, invoked so deftly by both the provincial bureaucrats who 
fought for the province and by A. H. Nasution and his lieutenants in Jakarta who 
finally approved its establishment, was less a form of popular resistance than an 
element in the conspiratorial politics conducted between Banjarmasin and Jakarta.
109 Rapid conversion earlier in the century had nearly persuaded the German mission to move its seminary 
from Banjarmasin to Kuala Kurung above Pahandut. See J. Paulus, ed., Encyclopaedic Van Nederlandsch- 
Indie, vol. 1 ('s Gravenshage: Martinus Nijhoff; and Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1917), 1:364.
110 Interview with T. T. Suan, Palangkaraya, May 12, 2003; Personal communication with Marko Mahin, 
December 12, 2003, based on recent interview with Ch. Simbar's brother, Damang Bubu Simbar.
111 Merdeka, April 23,1957.
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What a genuine local resistance against oppression might have looked like—and 
whether it would have adopted the same ethnic idiom—we do not learn from this 
story. Perhaps if Simbar had not been coopted, he would have developed his relations 
with Ibnu Hadjar's KRJT and fought, not for a province, nor for Pantjasila, nor for 
Islam, but for social justice.
The episode discussed here was shaped by the decentralized state-building efforts 
ongoing throughout Indonesia during the period, from the 1940s into the 1950s. The 
outcome was a new province that Dayak activists would long describe as "a Dayak 
home."112 Ethnic-identity politics had been admitted to the Republic of Indonesia, not 
because ethnic rebels intent on separatism had forced it in, but because Jakarta itself 
had chosen to recruit provincial loyalists who had presented themselves as "backward 
minorities seeking protection," a phrase that recalled the Dutch characterization of the 
Dayaks in Malino in 1946. These ethnic politics, with all their implied exclusion of non- 
Dayaks, would enjoy a resurgence in 2001. A revived Dayak militant organization, 
which included a well-connected militia resembling Ch. Simbar's vanished gang, 
sought to impress itself on post-Suharto provincial politics by expelling all migrants of 
Madurese origin from Central Kalimantan.113
This article has traced the ethnicization of local politics, not to any roots in popular 
local primordialism, but to the process of state formation under difficult conditions. In 
the 1940s, the new Indonesian state needed to find loyal partners in order to maintain 
or extend its influence into remote regions of its territory. By seeking out partners who 
promised to be effective on the ground, regardless of democratic procedure, the central 
state ended up sponsoring ambitious individuals with a record of mobilizing support 
along ethnic lines. Probably Jakarta's judgment of who these supporters might be 
derived from its own stereotypical, essentialist views about culture. Thus while Dayak 
identity politics did not appear to appeal greatly to the voting public, the military 
found it convenient, for a time, to sponsor violent expressions of it. They judged, 
correctly, that ethnic militancy can accord with loyalty to the center in cases where the 
ethnic loyalties exist in a relatively small and isolated territory ("backward minorities 
seeking protection"). Unlike democratically channeled ethnic sentiment, ethnic 
sentiment mobilized by the center is unlikely to threaten the status quo because it is 
handled by administrators and not unleashed through the ballot box. Thus the central 
state acts in ways contrary to its announced principles favoring modern, national 
inclusiveness, and actually sponsors, in a highly pragmatic way, chauvinistic ethnic 
movements in the regions. This mutual transformation and interpenetration of the 
state and social forces has been recognized in African politics since the 1970s. 
Politicized ethnicity is a product of state formation, via the creation of a petit bourgeois 
urban lower middle class that deploys it as its competitive ideology.114
112 Usop, Pakat Dayak, p. 82.
113 Gerry van Klinken, "Indonesia's New Ethnic Elites," in Indonesia: In Search o f  Transition, ed. Henk 
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There are also more recent examples of the Indonesian state adopting a strategy 
that favors indirect rule in order to its reinforce its own authority, a move that appears 
paradoxical, but is not. Burhan Magenda likened the rehabilitation of traditional 
aristocracies in the Outer Islands under the militaristic early New Order, following 
years of democratic republicanism in the 1950s, to a "revival of elements of Van 
Mook's federal rule: strong demands by the regional indigenous rulers to be governors 
and regents, protection of the rights of minorities, and the demand for kemajuan and 
pembangunan [progress and development]."115 Even more recently, Jakarta has 
sponsored localist movements among the Gayo in Aceh and among those who favor 
the establishment of a West Irian Jaya province in Papua. Both were intended to 
counter separatist sentiments that had revived after 1998.
Sometimes the strategy of seeking strong local partners and, in the process, 
ignoring democratic niceties spins out of control. The militant ethnic movements in 
West and Central Kalimantan that expelled Madurese local migrants in 1997,1999, and 
2001 were not exactly sponsored by Jakarta, but neither can they be understood as 
purely social expressions of outrage. They were quasi-fascist maneuvers by established 
local elites intended to capture and expand the local bureaucracy by deploying (threats 
of) mass violence, all conducted in a spirit not alien to the authoritarian New Order. 
They were hardly preceded or followed by any serious organized popular movements 
invoking ethnic identity.
The group identities put forward in these moments of moral panic are often flexible 
and pragmatic. Activists for Central Kalimantan province in the 1950s were mostly 
Christian (often associated with the Christian party, Parkindo), but they chose not to 
campaign on that basis, knowing it would cut little ice in Muslim-dominated Jakarta. 
The identities can moreover be reinvented when necessary. Recent attempts by local 
elites to promote the creation of a new (resource-rich) province of Greater Barito 
(Barito Jaya), to be carved out of Central Kalimantan, have appealed to an ethnic 
collective previously considered "sub-Dayak," comprising the Dusun, Ma'anyan, and 
Lawangan (abbreviated Dusmala). Their campaign has so far been unable to stir up the 
sympathetic responses in Jakarta that facilitated the creation of Central Kalimantan in 
the 1950s, responses motivated at the time by the central government's need to expand 
its own reach and reinforce the state.116
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